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Profiting from Regulation:  
Evidence from the European Carbon Market†
By James B. Bushnell, Howard Chong, and Erin T. Mansur*
We investigate how cap-and-trade regulation affects profits. In late 
April 2006, the EU C O 2 allowance price dropped 50 percent, equat-
ing to a € 28 billion reduction in the value of aggregate annual allow-
ances. We examine daily returns for 552 stocks from the EUROSTOXX 
index. Despite reductions in environmental costs, we find that stock 
prices fell for firms in both carbon- and electricity-intensive indus-
tries, particularly for firms selling primarily within the EU. Our 
results imply that investors focus on product price impacts, rather 
than just compliance costs and the nominal value of pollution per-
mits. (JEL G12, G14, L94, Q53, Q54, Q58)
There is a long-standing perception of a fundamental conflict between the inter-ests of business and environmental regulators. In many cases regulators apply 
policies that increase production costs, restrict production, or otherwise constrain 
the actions of firms. There is a rich literature chronicling the impacts that regula-
tions such as the Clean Air Act have had on industrial activity.1 With greenhouse 
gas regulation a controversial subject in the United States and already under way 
in the European Union (EU), the question of the impacts of these regulations on 
industry has taken center stage. As countries and regions around the world develop 
policies for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, there is an understandably 
great interest in how these policies will impact the competitiveness, productivity, 
and profitability of the industries to which they are applied.
Measuring the economic impacts of GHG regulations obviously has direct rel-
evance to setting the levels and timings of the regulations. Even setting aside the 
specific goals for GHG reductions, information about the overall magnitude and 
distribution of economic impacts has importance for the policymaking process. 
This is most starkly true in the case of cap-and-trade mechanisms, which create 
valuable new property rights in the form of emissions allowances (or permits). 
1 For example, see Gray (1987); Gray and Shadbegian (1998); Greenstone (2002); Becker and Henderson 
(2000); and List, Millimet, and McHone (2003).
* Bushnell: University of California at Davis, Economics Department, 1126 SSH, One Shields Avenue, Davis, 
CA 95616 and National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (e-mail: jbbushnell@ucdavis.edu); Chong: Cornell 
University, School of Hotel Administration, 545C Statler Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-6902 (e-mail: hc757@cornell.
edu); Mansur: Dartmouth College, Economics Department, 6106 Rockefeller Hall, Hanover, NH 03755 and NBER 
(e-mail: erin.mansur@dartmouth.edu). The authors are grateful for helpful discussion and comments from Antonio 
Bento, Denny Ellerman, Nat Keohane, Matt Kotchen, Arik Levinsohn, Mar Reguant, and seminar participants at 
Environmental Defense Fund, Georgetown, Harvard, Minnesota, UC Berkeley, UC Davis, MIT, and Yale University.
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.4.78 to visit the article page for additional materials and author 
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
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These permits constitute the “currency” of cap-and-trade markets. They also pro-
vide an important tool to policymakers for distributing the revenues collected by 
the carbon regulation. The process of allocating emissions allowances, while inev-
itably containing a strong element of political maneuvering, is usually driven by a 
desire to offset some of the cost impacts of the introduction of carbon regulation. 
Industries that claim to bear the brunt of the abatement costs usually stake the 
largest claim to allocations of allowances.
However, for most industrial enterprises, changes in direct abatement costs are 
only one piece of a complicated profitability puzzle. The introduction of a carbon 
dioxide (C O 2 ) price into an economy can have indirect impacts on firms that are not 
large C O 2 emitters. In most industries, increases in pollution prices will be reflected 
in output prices, and therefore revenues, as well as in costs. A more complete pic-
ture of these net impacts is necessary in any attempt to align allocations to the true 
economic impacts of C O 2 regulation on firms.
Indeed, the impact of regulations on profitability is ambiguous, even when those 
regulations have a substantial impact on costs. There are several mechanisms, rang-
ing from restricting entry (e.g., Ryan 2012) to raising rivals’ costs (e.g., Puller 
2006), through which revenue increases can outstrip cost increases thus enhancing 
profitability.2 With cap-and-trade regulations, the free allocation of emissions allow-
ances adds an additional source of revenue. In the case of GHG markets, these assets 
can total hundreds of billions of dollars.
Despite the politically motivated tendency to award emissions allowances pro-
portionally to emissions, several papers have concluded that this likely amounts to 
overcompensation of the affected industries. These papers use various simulation 
methodologies to forecast potential impacts of carbon taxes or caps. Bovenberg and 
Goulder (2001) and Goulder, Hafstead, and Dworsky (2010) utilize general equilib-
rium models to assess the likely impacts of a carbon tax and various cap-and-trade 
policies on a wide set of industries. Burtraw and Palmer (2008) simulate the US 
electricity sector under potential cap-and-trade scenarios. Smale et al. (2006) simu-
late several industries under a carbon cap in Europe using an assumption of Cournot 
competition. All these studies find that for many industries, compensation of less 
than 20 percent of emissions would offset the profitability impacts of regulation.
In this paper we study impacts on firms of the largest, in monetary terms, cap-
and-trade market in the world—the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) for 
C O 2 . To date, this is the most significant effort by far at regulating C O 2 emissions 
in the world. As a role model for carbon cap-and-trade, the ETS has been closely 
scrutinized both within and outside the European Union. From the outset, the rela-
tive impact of the ETS on EU industries has been a controversial topic, one that has 
strongly influenced policies for the allocation of emissions allowances. During its 
first phase of operation from 2005 through 2007, the prices of emissions allowances 
in the EU market were quite volatile. While this volatility sparked criticism about 
2 For example, Ryan (2012) demonstrates how the Clean Air Act significantly increased the sunk cost of entry in 
the Portland cement industry. Puller (2006) demonstrates how firms can profit from increased regulation by raising 
rival’s costs, leading them to promote the adoption of those regulations.
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the design and implementation of this phase of the market, we take advantage of it 
in order to examine the impact of C O 2 prices on firms.
Rather than attempting to directly untangle the many competing effects of the ETS 
on firms, we focus on the stock market valuations of publicly traded firms influenced 
by C O 2 regulation. Specifically, we examine the impact of a sharp devaluation in C O 2 
prices in late April 2006 as an event study on the share prices of affected firms. Such 
an exercise can be interpreted in several ways. Under an assumption of fundamental 
market valuation, these prices should reflect the market’s expected discounted future 
profits of the firms. Even if one does not adhere to an assumption that the market fully 
reflects expectations of future profitability, the event provides a useful window into the 
beliefs of the market about the impacts of movements in C O 2 prices.
Our results imply that several industrial sectors benefited from the ETS rather 
than being hurt by the imposition of C O 2 regulation. Indeed, when C O 2 prices fell (a relaxation of regulation), the sharpest declines in equity prices occurred within 
industries that are the most carbon-intensive. In addition to raising costs, C O 2 regu-
lation can “pass-through” to affect the prices of the goods sold and firm revenue. In 
some cases, unregulated or less-regulated firms in regulated industries may benefit 
from the regulation. The stock market response to the April event indicates that C O 2 
prices play a significant role in determining product prices and revenues in many of 
these industries, and that this revenue effect may dominate costs for those industries. 
We also examine the stock market price responses relative to a measure of European 
market exposure and find strong evidence that the benefits of higher C O 2 prices were 
concentrated among firms with the most exposure to markets within the EU.
In Section I, we briefly review the EU C O 2 market and its pricing from 2005–
2007 and examine the impact of the crash in permit prices in late April 2006 using a 
stock market event study. In Section II, we develop a simple model of the channels 
through which C O 2 costs can impact firm profitability. In Section III, we empirically 
decompose the underlying impact to elements of firm and industry characteristics 
that influenced the response to the change in C O 2 prices. We conclude in Section IV.
I. An Event Study of the EU ETS
The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) was developed as one of the central 
mechanisms for which the European Union member states could achieve compli-
ance with the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and is in many ways a remark-
able accomplishment. The world’s first significant cap-and-trade system for C O 2 , 
the ETS covers most industries and 27 countries, including several that took on no 
Kyoto obligations. The ETS did not cover emissions from transportation fuels or 
residential fuel combustion. The ETS has been rolled out in phases. The first phase, 
running from 2005 through 2007, was intended as much to develop institutions and 
gain regulatory experience as to achieve substantial C O 2 reductions. The overall cap 
for the market was an aggregation of caps developed by each participating country 
through their “national allocation plans,” previously analyzed by Betz, Eichhammer, 
and Schleich (2004). The EU established guidelines for the development of these 
plans, but member states were left with significant latitude. Efforts at setting an 
appropriate cap were complicated by the fact that, prior to 2005, the monitoring of 
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C O 2 emissions of many facilities and countries was unreliable at best. Caps were 
supposed to be set in a manner that would place emissions reductions on a trajectory 
consistent with meeting the Kyoto targets. However, the effective stringency of the 
Kyoto targets varied greatly among EU member states. The implementation plans 
reflected large differences between member states in the level of total C O 2 reduc-
tions and how many reductions would come from industries covered by the ETS.
One source of variation among participating nations was their relative approach to 
assigning permits to the covered industries. As chronicled in Ellerman and Buchner 
(2008), Kettner et al. (2008), and Ellerman and Joskow (2008), countries such as 
Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom appear to have imposed more stringent caps. 
As a consequence, the affected industries in these countries, particularly in the power 
sector, were allocated fewer permits than their observed emissions. These firms were 
therefore net buyers of permits within the EU. Industries in other countries, particu-
larly in Eastern Europe, were observed to emit far less than their allocations.
Another important contrast lay in the allocation of permits across the various 
industrial sectors. Online Appendix Table A1 shows the allocations relative to emis-
sions by industrial sector of firms we have matched. In general, many regulated 
firms in the manufacturing sectors received more permits than they subsequently 
needed to cover their observed emissions. Those providing power and heat, pre-
dominantly electricity firms, were generally “short” of permits, but still received 
allocations equivalent to a substantial majority of their emissions.
Overall, by the end of phase I, available permits exceeded measured emissions by 
about 2.8 percent (Convery, Ellerman, and De Perthuis 2008). Although the eventual 
surplus in permits led to a perception of intentionally lax regulation through “over-
allocation,” the picture is more nuanced. An ex post realization of a surplus does 
not necessarily imply over-allocation, since a surplus of allowances can arise from 
either over-allocation or over-abatement. Since emissions prices were quite high for 
some of this period, it is natural to expect some abatement to have occurred, at least 
while emission prices were high. Studies by Ellerman and Buchner (2008) as well as 
Delarue, Voorspools, and D’haeseleer (2008) indicate that at least some abatement did 
take place. In addition, macroeconomic and weather shocks may have played a role 
in lower than expected emissions, and specific directed regulations such as aggressive 
subsidies for renewable electricity production may have been sufficient to tip the mar-
ket into surplus (Convery, Ellerman, and De Perthuis 2008). Importantly, none of this 
was known for much of the first phase, and it was only after the phase was more than 
two-thirds complete that the surplus conditions pushed emissions prices to near zero.
A. ETS market Performance
The most notorious aspect of the ETS during phase I was the volatility of the 
permit prices, which was greatly exacerbated by the fact that permits could not 
be “banked” for use beyond 2007. The ETS market was characterized by an early 
period in which prices were higher than anticipated, and a later period in which 
the price eventually reached zero in the face of a surplus of permits that held no 
value beyond 2007. From the onset of trading in January 2005 through March 2006, 
prices rose steadily to over €30 per tonne. While in hindsight this price rise appears 
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 somewhat surprising given the eventual surplus of permits, it was not necessarily 
considered anomalous at the time. Many attribute the relatively high prices during 
this phase to the fact that prices for natural gas, which largely defines the marginal 
costs of reducing C O 2 emissions in the power sector through its substitution for 
coal, were steadily rising during this period.3 In addition, while firms from countries 
“short” on permits were apparently relatively active in trading from the beginning, 
those from many “long” Eastern European countries were not active due to delays in 
integrating their regulatory platforms with that of the EU. This may have contributed 
to masking what later emerged as a surplus of available permits.
The lack of reliable information about aggregate emissions was also a critical 
contributor to the volatility in prices. This was highlighted on April 25, 2006, 
when the first reports of country-level emissions began to leak into the permit 
market. As can be seen in Figure 1, the reaction was dramatic. Over the next few 
days, the permit price as reported on the European Climate Exchange fell from 
€28 (per tonne) on April 25 to €14 on April 28. The price drop hit both phase I 
(2005–2007 compliance period) permit prices as well as permits covering phase II 
(2008–2012 compliance period), which had begun trading in 2006. These initial 
reports were revised shortly after they were leaked to the public, and information 
from other countries was released in the following days. By May 15, when the 
final emissions totals were officially released, phase I prices had rebounded and 
then fallen slightly again to settle around €16.
During this one month period, the general movements of prices for both the 
phase I and phase II permits had been generally consistent with each other, although 
the magnitudes were more muted in the case of the longer term phase II permits. 
Later in 2006 the two price series diverged for good, with the phase I prices starting 
a steady decline toward zero and the phase II series settling into a range around €20.
B. Equity market Effects
We now turn to the question of how the sharp devaluation in permit prices 
in April 2006 impacted expectations about firm profitability. A few papers have 
empirically looked at different segments of the EU market. Sijm, Neuhoff, and 
Chen (2006) examine the implications specifically for electricity prices in the 
Netherlands and Germany and find substantial pass-through of carbon cost. 
Convery, Ellerman, and De Perthuis (2008) note that net incomes of several 
large electricity producers increased throughout phase I of the ETS. Two similar 
papers, Veith, Werner, and Zimmermann (2009), and Oberndorfer (2009) examine 
stock market returns of electricity companies using a panel regression of share 
prices on C O 2 prices throughout the phase I period. Both find that share prices 
of large electricity producers who were regulated under the ETS were positively 
linked with prices for C O 2 . However, in contrast to our results, Veith, Werner, and 
Zimmermann (2009) find that share prices of “clean” electricity producers not 
covered under the ETS had no significant response to C O 2 prices.
3 Ellerman and Joskow (2008).
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Figure 1. EU Carbon Prices, Stock Index, and Oil Prices
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While these latter two papers also study equity market impacts of ETS prices, 
our work differs in several important ways. First, we choose to focus on the specific 
three-day event of the price crash in an attempt to isolate the most dramatic ETS 
price change from other movements in the ETS price that could be either poten-
tially endogenous or correlated to other market drivers such as macroeconomic or 
commodity price shocks. Second, we examine a broad set of industries that were 
both directly and indirectly impacted by ETS regulations. Third, in Section III, we 
decompose the impact by looking at industrial and firm characteristics.
In this paper, we also utilize equity prices of publicly traded firms. It is important 
to note that many firms directly subject to the C O 2 cap, as well as those in impacted 
industries, are privately held or government owned. A large number of publicly 
traded firms were also affected, however, and we focus our attention on these firms. 
We employ a standard event-study approach.4 We examine firms contained in the 
Dow Jones STOXX 600 index, which is similar to the S&P 500 but covers European 
firms.5 We focus on the three days after the initial leak of permit market informa-
tion, the daily returns for April 26–28. Several papers have utilized an event study 
approach to assess the impact of environmental regulation on firm profits.6 Because 
this approach has usually utilized a political or legal decision as the “event,” a com-
mon concern has been that information may have leaked into the market before the 
examined event date. Here we can be confident that there was little leakage of infor-
mation as this information would have impacted the C O 2 price, which was steadily 
rising up until our event date.
A related concern in this context is that the price of allowances themselves may 
be driven by shocks to the product markets of the firms that are regulated. This is 
a central reason why we focus our analysis on this rather unique event. The price 
shock here is driven by the update of information about aggregate amounts of allow-
ances consumed, and can therefore be considered an environmental cost shock that 
is exogenous to the underlying product markets of firms. By contrast, previous work 
on the EU carbon market, which utilizes full panel data, is much more vulnerable to 
the endogeneity criticism.
We utilize the following specification for investigating the potential for abnormal 
returns during this event window. For firm i, industry j, and day t :
(1)   S ijt =  α i +  β i  m t +  γ j EVEN T t +  ϵ ijt ,
where  S ijt is the firm’s daily return (i.e., the percent change in the stock price), 
m t is the daily return of the Dow Jones STOXX 600 market index, and EVEN T t 
is a dummy variable that is scaled according to the length of the event window.7 
4 This method is based on Fama et al. (1969). Notable surveys include Brown and Warner (1985), MacKinlay 
(1997), and Corrado (2011).
5 We chose this index because of its breadth of firms and of geography. Other commonly cited European indices 
such as the FTSE 100 and the DAX are more limited in coverage of European countries and industries.
6 These include Kahn and Knittel (2002) and Linn (2006, 2010). A related literature has examined environmen-
tal information disclosure and market returns (Dasgupta, Laplante, and Mamingi 2001; Dasgupta et al. 2006; Beatty 
and Shimshack 2010; Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn 2011).
7 For our base specification, where the event window is three days, EVEN T t is set to be 1/3 so that  γ j represents 
the industry-average, cumulative excess return for industry j during the three-day event window.
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We estimate  γ j for each two-digit NACE industry classification.8 The window for 
estimating the relationship with the market index,  β i , is the two years overlapping 
the event window, April 2005–April 2007.
Table 1 reports the cumulative abnormal returns,  γ j , by industry. Many of the larg-
est significant declines were in industries that feature prominently in the EU ETS: 
Basic Metals, Oil and Gas Extraction, and Utilities. However, there are also notable 
declines in such industries as Sewage and Refuse, Land Transportation, and Water 
Utilities. As we describe below, each of these industries are relatively large users of 
electricity and sell to relatively local markets. Conversely other industries such as 
chemicals and food manufacturing, which are also large electricity users but have 
sales that are not highly concentrated in the EU, experienced little change during the 
carbon price-reduction event.
One possible explanation is that share prices were responding to new information 
about the volatility of carbon prices, rather than the levels of carbon prices. We evalu-
ate this possibility by running an event study on the market response to another win-
dow in which the ETS price experienced its largest three day gain before the collapse 
of April–May 2006. We posit that traders’ expectations about the volatility of prices 
were similarly affected during this large increase in prices as they were by the main 
event when prices fell. This window was in January of 2006, when ETS prices rose 
by 16 percent. The last two columns of Table 1 describe the results for this “counter-
event.” The correlation between the point estimates in price-reduction event and those 
in the counter-event is −0.32. If the volatility explanation were correct, we would 
expect that abnormal returns responding to a C O 2 price increase to have the same sign 
as a price decrease. We describe in a later section that the volatility explanation is also 
inconsistent with the pattern of firm-level results for the electricity industry.
We report standard errors clustered by date in Tables 1 and 2 because of plausible 
contemporaneous correlation across firms on the same day. We explore the sensitiv-
ity of the significance of the results for the average across all industries and separate 
estimates for three major industries: crude petroleum extraction, basic metals, and 
electricity and gas. Online Appendix Table A2 reports the OLS coefficients and stan-
dard errors, robust standard errors, and standard errors clustered by firm, by two-digit 
NACE industry, by industry and date, and by date. We find that our preferred standard 
errors (clustered by date) are about twice as large as the robust standard errors. The 
last row of online Appendix Table A2 reports two-way clustered standard errors (by 
firm and date); this corrects standard errors in the event study which would otherwise 
be biased by serial correlation and correlated contemporaneous error terms across 
firms (Salinger 1992; Petersen 2009). For contemporaneous correlation, Salinger 
(1992) suggests creating a portfolio of returns for each industry.9 However, as we are 
8 NACE is the European standard classification of productive economic activities. The US classification, NAICS 
is more widely used in the literature, but is more difficult to link to the characteristics of European firms and coun-
tries. A previous version of this paper utilized NAICS and found similar results. Weiner (2005) evaluates several 
industrial classification schemes and finds drawbacks in each.
9 Salinger (1992) describes two methods for correcting standard errors. If an event study has long event win-
dows that are not concurrent across firms, he recommends addressing serial correlation by using GLS (this is akin 
to clustering by firm). However, if the event windows are short and concurrent for a set of firms, he suggests using 
the Mandelker-Jaffe technique of collapsing the firms with the same event window to a single portfolio. Rather than 
collapsing data, we cluster by date and firm to address this issue.
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interested in the  across-firm and across-industry heterogeneity, online Appendix 
Table A3 reports the two-way clustered standard errors for all industries that con-
trol for contemporaneous correlation of error terms and serial correlation (Petersen 
2009; Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011). The industry-specific results corrected 
for these potential standard error biases are similar to the main results in Table 1.
Table 1—Stock Market Three Business Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry
NACE Industry description Observations
−44% permit price drop 
April 26, 2006 main event
+16% permit price rise 
January 13, 2006 event
10 Coal and lignite mining 2 −0.032 (0.021) 0.045 (0.034)
11 Crude petroleum extraction 20 −0.032 (0.017)* 0.038 (0.017)**
27 Basic metals 15 −0.031 (0.011)*** 0.055 (0.027)**
90 Sewage and refuse 1 −0.027 (0.012)** 0.037 (0.033)
61 Water transport 2 −0.027 (0.020) 0.001 (0.023)
23 Refining and coke 2 −0.027 (0.015)* 0.037 (0.016)**
30 Computer manufacturing 2 −0.023 (0.007)*** −0.056 (0.055)
13 Metal ores mining 7 −0.023 (0.023) 0.096 (0.034)***
16 Tobacco manufacturing 3 −0.019 (0.005)*** 0.019 (0.016)
40 Electricity and gas 26 −0.017 (0.014) 0.049 (0.026)*
70 Real estate 16 −0.016 (0.003)*** 0.023 (0.010)**
41 Water 4 −0.016 (0.008)* 0.035 (0.027)
60 Land transport 5 −0.011 (0.010) 0.004 (0.009)
25 Rubber and plastics 3 −0.010 (0.010) 0.006 (0.023)
72 Computer activities 11 −0.009 (0.010) 0.004 (0.005)
35 Other transport 8 −0.009 (0.010) 0.014 (0.010)
55 Hotels and restaurants 9 −0.009 (0.004)** 0.025 (0.020)
34 Motor vehicles 11 −0.008 (0.018) −0.003 (0.007)
32 Radio and TV 12 −0.008 (0.005) 0.022 (0.029)
31 Electrical machinery 6 −0.007 (0.014) −0.002 (0.003)
52 Retail trade 19 −0.006 (0.001)*** 0.001 (0.012)
45 Construction 28 −0.006 (0.004) 0.007 (0.009)
33 Medical instruments 16 −0.005 (0.006) 0.009 (0.004)**
22 Publishing and printing 8 −0.004 (0.006) 0.002 (0.010)
62 Air transport 5 −0.003 (0.003) −0.016 (0.003)***
21 Pulp and paper 5 −0.003 (0.011) 0.014 (0.009)
15 Food manufacturing 20 −0.003 (0.005) 0.004 (0.003)
74 Other business activities 56 −0.001 (0.002) 0.010 (0.002)***
67 Auxiliary financials 9 0.000 (0.003) 0.047 (0.023)**
29 Machinery 18 0.000 (0.006) 0.010 (0.008)
24 Chemicals 38 0.000 (0.002) 0.007 (0.001)***
65 Financial intermediation 53 0.001 (0.001) 0.007 (0.002)***
18 Apparel manufacturing 5 0.002 (0.006) −0.012 (0.006)**
64 Post and telecomm 27 0.002 (0.001)** −0.014 (0.001)***
36 Furniture 3 0.003 (0.004) 0.032 (0.035)
66 Insurance 26 0.004 (0.008) 0.002 (0.004)
92 Recreational and cultural 11 0.005 (0.010) −0.008 (0.003)***
85 Health and social work 1 0.007 (0.033) 0.005 (0.010)
19 Tanning leather 1 0.007 (0.002)*** 0.016 (0.016)
28 Fabricated metals 6 0.008 (0.008) 0.005 (0.007)
26 Nonmetallic manufacturing 9 0.009 (0.015) 0.025 (0.009)***
51 Wholesale trade 7 0.010 (0.007) 0.021 (0.006)***
63 Supporting transport 10 0.014 (0.003)*** −0.003 (0.007)
14 Other mining 1 0.016 (0.029) −0.002 (0.011)
71 Renting machinery 1 0.022 (0.023) 0.043 (0.027)
All industries 548 −0.005 (0.003)* 0.013 (0.006)**
Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by date. There are 552 firms and 249,844 observations.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2 reports several specification robustness checks drawing on the event 
study literature.10 We put in controls for the impact of financial leverage in stocks, 
10 We follow event study methods used in recent papers. See Corrado (2011) for a review of this literature. Much 
of this literature has focused on standard error corrections to the typical two-step estimator in finance, whereby 
one first estimates the abnormal returns and second uses these returns as a dependent variable. See Linn (2010) for 
a recent application of this method. We have also used this procedure (see Bushnell, Chong, and Mansur 2009). 
Table 2—Robustness of Event Study
12-month 
window
6-month 
window Preevent Debt-equity
No 
betas
Big 
event
Industry description (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coal and lignite mining −0.032 −0.030 −0.036* −0.032*** −0.041* −0.078
Crude petroleum extraction −0.030* −0.029* −0.036** −0.032 −0.044* −0.069
Basic metals −0.029** −0.030** −0.037*** −0.031 −0.047*** −0.026
Sewage and refuse −0.029** −0.029** −0.029** −0.028 −0.033*** −0.094*
Water transport −0.027 −0.021 −0.025 −0.027 −0.035** −0.128**
Refining and coke −0.024 −0.026* −0.029* −0.027 −0.037** −0.087
Computer manufacturing −0.022*** −0.021*** −0.024*** −0.023 −0.034*** −0.081*
Metal ores mining −0.023 −0.021 −0.031 −0.023* −0.041 0.016
Tobacco manufacturing −0.020*** −0.022*** −0.021*** −0.020 −0.025*** −0.018
Electricity and gas −0.017 −0.017 −0.019 −0.017 −0.026 −0.031
Real estate −0.017*** −0.016*** −0.019*** −0.017 −0.025*** −0.042
Water −0.017* −0.016* −0.017* −0.017 −0.023* −0.025
Land transport −0.010 −0.009 −0.011 −0.012** −0.02*** −0.033
Rubber and plastics −0.009 −0.005 −0.011 −0.011 −0.022** −0.087**
Computer activities −0.008 −0.005 −0.012 −0.009 −0.022 −0.023
Other transport −0.007 −0.005 −0.012 −0.009 −0.022 −0.042
Hotels and restaurants −0.009** −0.008* −0.008* −0.009*** −0.017*** −0.012
Motor vehicles −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.009 −0.020 −0.023
Radio and TV −0.005 −0.004 −0.01* −0.008 −0.022* −0.063**
Electrical machinery −0.007 −0.005 −0.019 −0.007*** −0.021 0.017
Retail trade −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.006*** −0.006 −0.014*** 0.023
Construction −0.005 −0.003 −0.008** −0.006* −0.018*** −0.020
Medical instruments −0.004 −0.003 −0.006 −0.005 −0.015 −0.022
Publishing and printing −0.004 −0.002 −0.005 −0.002 −0.011** −0.036*
Air transport −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.014*** −0.022
Pulp and paper −0.004 −0.003 −0.007 −0.003*** −0.013 −0.045
Food manufacturing −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.010 −0.005
Other business activities −0.001 0.000 −0.003 −0.002 −0.012 −0.018
Auxiliary financials 0.000 0.001 −0.004 0.000 −0.013 −0.023
Machinery 0.001 0.002 −0.005 0.000 −0.014 0.002
Chemicals 0.000 0.001 −0.001 0.000* −0.010 −0.010
Financial intermediation 0.001 0.002 −0.001 −0.002** −0.009 −0.006
Apparel manufacturing 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002*** −0.008 −0.022
Post and telecomm 0.003* 0.003* 0.003** 0.002*** −0.006 −0.011
Furniture 0.005 0.006* 0.000 0.003 −0.010 −0.027
Insurance 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.004 −0.008 −0.017
Recreational and cultural 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.007** −0.003 0.004
Health and social work 0.010 0.014 0.004 0.007 −0.002 0.018
Tanning leather 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.006* 0.007 −0.002 −0.006
Fabricated metals 0.009 0.010 0.005 0.008*** −0.004 −0.043
Nonmetallic manufacturing 0.010 0.012 0.005 0.009 −0.001 −0.023
Wholesale trade 0.010 0.012 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.004
Supporting transport 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.014 0.004 0.038
Other mining 0.017 0.021 0.014 0.016 0.006 0.024
Renting machinery 0.025 0.029 0.020 0.021*** 0.009 −0.115**
All industries −0.005* −0.003 −0.006 −0.006** −0.016* −0.019
Notes: Industries are sorted by main event in Table 1. See Table 1 for other notes.
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consider the possibility of event-induced changes in volatility, and vary the length 
of the event window. Columns 1 and 2 summarize the results using shorter windows 
of one year and six months, respectively. Column 3 utilizes only pre-event data to 
estimate  α i and  β i . Column 4 controls for a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio during the 
event window. Note that the net present value of all future profits equals the sum of 
equity and debt. By including the debt-equity ratio, we are testing the robustness of 
our results that the findings represent changes in profits, not just in equity. Column 5 
provides the results using just the raw returns with no controls for the market index 
(i.e., no  β i ). Column 6 examines the question of the appropriate time window for the 
event. From Figure 1, we see that the volatility in permit prices continued beyond 
the three-day window examined above. Here we examine a 30-day event window 
consisting of five days prior and 25 days after April 25, 2006. In each case, the quali-
tative results are robust. For each of the first five columns, the correlation between 
the industry estimates here and those in the main results of Table 1 exceeds 0.98. 
For the longer event in column 6, the market experienced a more significant decline 
overall and the correlation with the main results of Table 1 is less, 0.47.
These results summarize general effects but do not account for firm heterogeneity 
within each classification. In the following sections we provide some structure to the 
analysis by describing the theory of how input cost shocks, such as the ETS price 
drop, influence firm profits.
II. Emissions Regulations and Firm Profits
Having established that the carbon price-crash impacted sectors differentially, and 
that “dirtier” sectors appear to have performed the worst during the event, we turn 
to a deeper examination of the economic mechanisms that produced this result. We 
briefly discuss a theoretical model considering the potential impacts of environmen-
tal regulation, or more specifically emissions costs, on firm profitability and perfor-
mance. The model provides a useful framework for decomposing and illustrating the 
various potential impacts, both positive and negative, of emissions costs on firms. In 
the following sections, we then present empirical tests of which market elements and 
firm characteristics most influenced market performance during this period.
Consider firm i producing for a market represented by the demand curve, 
P( q i +  q ≠i ), where  q ≠i represents total production by other firms in this market. 
The firm is subject to cap-and-trade regulation of its emissions, which are in turn a 
function of its emissions rate,  r i , its total production,  q i , and level of abatement,  I i .11 
We assume that the production technology, along with a given level of abatement,  I i , 
determines the emissions rate,  r i ( q i ,  I i ), and that abatement incurs costs of k( I i ). The 
per-unit price of emissions allowances is τ, resulting in direct compliance costs of 
However, following a referee’s recommendation, we now use a single-step procedure common in the economic 
literature that addresses heteroskedasticity and correlation across stocks through clustered standard errors.
11 The model is intended to be general, encompassing both perfectly competitive industries and those in which 
individual firms have market power. However, it is important to also acknowledge aspects of oligopoly competition 
that are not explicitly represented within this framework. In oligopoly settings, cost shocks such as environmental 
regulations can increase profitability by increasing the severity of market power in an industry. In a dynamic set-
ting, the environmental regulation could serve as a barrier to entry or even as a collusive focal point. Even in a static 
setting, the imposition of an environmental tax can increase margins under certain demand structures (Seade 1985).
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τ  r i ( q i ,  I i ) q i . However, the firm may possess allowances  A i equal to its initial  allocation 
less net sales. Considering both input and environmental costs, the profits of firm i 
can be represented as
(2)   π i = P ( q i +  q ≠i )  q i −  C i ( q i , ω) + τ  A i − τ  r i ( q i ,  I i )  q i − k ( I i ),
where the function  C i ( q i , ω) represents the total cost of producing  q i with a vector 
of input costs, w.
In the Appendix, we derive the following expression for how an exogenous shock 
to permit prices affect the profits of firm i :
(3)   d π i 
∗  _
dτ  = P′  
∂  q ≠i ∗  _∂ τ   q i 
∗ +  [ P′  ∂  q ≠i ∗  _∂ ω   q i ∗ −  ∂ C _∂ ω  ]   ∂ ω _∂ τ  +  [ A i −  r i  q i ∗ ] , 
where  q i ∗ and  π i ∗ are consistent with profit maximization.
The individual terms in equation (3) illustrate the competing potential effects of 
a change in the allowance price. First, revenues may increase due to the fact that 
other firms in the industry have collectively responded by reducing output in direct 
response to the permit price. This is similar to a “raising rivals’ costs” effect.12 
Under the assumption that firms would reduce output in the face of an increase in 
allowance costs, this term would be positive. Second, the middle term on the right 
hand side of (3) captures the impact of changes in profits from the indirect effect 
of permits through input costs. Environmental regulations may increase the price of 
inputs like electricity that, in turn, affect the costs of downstream firms and therefore 
prices in the product market. This effect is theoretically ambiguous. We can think of 
these first two components as the (net) “revenue effect,” or in other words, the pass-
through of the cost of allowances on to product prices.
Third, the last term reflects the effect on direct compliance costs of changes in 
allowance prices. If a firm is a large emitter and has a low allocation of allowances, 
it will have high cost exposure to allowance prices. Conversely, if a firm is holding 
more allowances than it expects to consume in its own production, its value will be 
enhanced by higher allowance prices: i.e., the firm is “short” in allowances, A < rq.
For each firm, the magnitude of these effects will depend upon several factors: 
(i) whether the firm produces in a market that is subject to the environmental regu-
lation (either directly or indirectly through input prices); (ii) the price elasticity of 
demand in that product market; (iii) how many permits the firm owns, and (iv) the 
convexity of costs with respect to allowance prices in an industry. Figure 2 helps 
to illustrate these factors for a given competitive, product market. We assume that 
the firms in this market face demand curve D, and have a supply function reflecting 
marginal costs  c τ 1 before the imposition, or increase, in allowance prices. Demand 
is assumed to be unaffected by a change in allowance prices.
The classic analysis of the incidence of taxation implies a vertical shift of the 
marginal cost curve to  c τ 2 . In the context of environmental regulation, this is 
12 Salop and Scheffman (1983).
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 equivalent to assuming that emissions rates are constant for all quantities produced. 
In this case, the producer surplus is reduced from the sum of areas B and C to the 
area A in Figure 2, panel A. The allocation of permits or emissions tax revenues 
would then be critical in determining the net effect of the regulation. If firms in this 
market received a free allocation equivalent to 100 percent of their ex post emis-
sions, this would be a transfer equivalent to the areas C and D, which totally offset 
the increased regulatory cost. As long as the demand for the product is sufficiently 
inelastic (i.e., as long as the new equilibrium market quantity is at least the monop-
oly solution without the regulation), profits will improve because revenue (less pro-
duction costs) will increase more than the increase in environmental costs. Indeed 
as Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) demonstrate, only a relatively small allocation of 
emissions  allowances is necessary to fully compensate many industries for changes 
in profits due to C O 2 costs.
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Figure 2. Theoretical Change in Producer Surplus under Environmental Regulation
Notes: Under a tax, or auctioned permits, firms gain area A but lose areas B and C. However, if firms are allocated 
permits equal to their equilibrium emissions, they gain A and D and lose only B.
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Even without an allocation of allowances, the impact on firm profits can be 
ambiguous. This is due to the fact that there are both heterogeneous firms and pro-
duction technologies within most markets. Consider a case where emissions rates 
are increasing with production quantities, as illustrated in Figure 2, panel B. The 
increase in allowance costs now rotates marginal costs, and therefore increases 
prices in this perfectly competitive circumstance. The increase in average costs is 
well below the increase in marginal costs, however. Now the new producer surplus, 
area A, could be larger than the previous surplus of B and C. A similar effect could 
arise if an individual firm has technology with a lower emissions rate than its rivals. 
Again, product prices could rise faster than the firm’s average production costs.
The magnitude of the revenue effect depends upon consumers’ burden for the 
allowance price: If most of the incidence of an increase in emissions costs is passed 
on to consumers, firms can profit from more stringent regulation. In contrast, if a 
firm sells in a market with a high demand elasticity, then even a substantial convex-
ity in the marginal cost curve would not compensate for the fact that the producer is 
absorbing the bulk of the incidence (Figure 2, panel C).
This discussion is meant to illustrate the varied potential effects and emphasize the 
importance of several key industry characteristics in determining the net effects of 
environmental regulations. In the following sections, we develop several proxy vari-
ables meant to reflect these characteristics in order to examine the market return of 
individual firms and industries in response to a substantial decline in emissions costs.
III. Testing Determinants of Profitability
In the following subsections, we examine industry and firm characteristics that 
determine the relative impact of C O 2 price changes on profitability. Profitability 
drivers include cost exposure to the emissions market through one’s emissions rela-
tive to one’s allowance holdings, as well as potential revenue effects driven by cost 
impacts on competitors within an industry.
We begin with a focus on the electricity industry for several reasons. First, this 
sector was by far the largest single source of emissions, accounting for 57 percent of 
covered emissions during this phase of the market (Kettner et al. 2008). Second, as 
described above, allocations to this sector were relatively conservative. Most firms 
in this sector were expected to be net short, and therefore “buyers” on the allowance 
market. Third, this industry offers more detailed firm-level data than the manufac-
turing sector, allowing us to examine firm-level characteristics.
A. Electricity Industry Impacts
The ETS price can impact firm profits through the direct cost effect of the regula-
tion, as well as the impact on the prices of the products sold by the regulated firms. 
As the electricity sector is the largest and most carbon-intensive sector, these effects 
are expected to dominate. To the extent that industry prices rise faster than the costs 
of a specific firm, that firm can benefit from the regulation.
One notable market impact of the ETS price crash is the interaction with whole-
sale electricity prices. Figure 3 illustrates the clearing prices of several electricity 
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futures contracts traded on the European Energy Exchange. The figure plots the 
daily clearing prices of contracts for “baseload,” or all-hour, electricity delivered to 
the German and to the French grids during the last two quarters of 2006 and the first 
two quarters of 2007.13 While there is seasonality in the overall levels of these clear-
ing prices, all clearly and immediately respond the EU ETS price change. These 
continental European electricity prices for both near term and longer term deliveries 
all fell by about 10 percent between April 25 and May 3, 2006. As we discuss below, 
our results indicate that equity market reaction in general seemed to be focused on 
the impacts of ETS prices on revenues rather than costs in this and other sectors.
Equation (3) illustrates that this impact would not be felt uniformly by firms 
within the industry. Although indirect costs are not a significant issue in the electric-
ity industry, we can decompose the firm-level effects by considering their revenues 
and direct cost exposure. To measure direct cost exposure we utilize the emissions 
and allowance data contained in the EU’s Community Independent Transaction Log 
(CITL) and from CARMA.14
13 The source of these data is the European Energy Exchange. See: www.eex.com.
14 This CITL dataset contains facility level information on the allocation and emissions of over 12,000 facilities 
throughout the EU. Unfortunately, firm ownership of facilities is reported inconsistently within the CITL, making 
necessary a manual matching of facilities to firms, and then to individual stock listings. The CARMA data is of 
power plant generation and emissions and comes from the Carbon Monitoring for Action project (carma.org) pub-
lished by the Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.
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We were able to match emissions and allocations for facilities owned by 124 firms 
in our sample, including 15 in the electricity sector.15 For each of these firms, we 
take total 2005 emissions and permit allocations aggregated over all covered facili-
ties owned by the firms. Using these data, we can construct a measure of  A i using 
the historic 2005 allocation, and of  E i , the historic 2005 emissions (as measured in 
the spring of 2006). Note that, although the CITL registers all transactions, only the 
allocations and emissions data are currently publicly available. Therefore, we do not 
know the actual holdings of a given firm on any day, only their initial allocations. 
Our values for ( A i −  E i ) should be considered only as a proxy for firms’ actual net 
positions at the time of the price-crash. Importantly, the broader market also did not 
know these positions and was relying upon the same data.
As described above, many industry classifications were “long” in permits during 
this period. The important exception is the power industry which as a whole was net 
short of permits (Ellerman and Buchner 2008). Given the lack of market informa-
tion about permit trading, investors were unlikely to know the exact net position of 
firms, and may have had difficulty even estimating the sign of net position. Figure 4 
15 Matching occurred in two stages. In one stage, primary internet domain names for firms (SP500 and 
STOXX600) were gathered from the ORBIS database and these were matched to the internet domain names taken 
from the CITL records of e-mail addresses. In the second stage, facilities were matched by hand through internet 
searches on the largest emitting facilities and firms drawn from the largest emitting sectors.
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plots the 124 firms’ permit allocations and emissions during 2005 and demonstrates 
this point. Many firms had been allocated permits that were very highly correlated 
with their 2005 emissions levels. We find that the log of initial allocation explains 
over 95 percent of the variation in the log of 2005 emissions. Similar effects are 
found when limiting the sample to the electricity sector.
Table 3 summarizes market effects for firms contained in the electricity sector. 
For each firm, columns 1 and 2 present the main April event and “counter-event” 
effects. The correlation between them is −0.65. This suggests that the direction of 
the change in permit prices matters, and the impact is not driven by an increase in 
volatility. Columns 3–6 provide firm-level characteristics for the electricity firms. 
Several patterns emerge between the main price-reduction event coefficients and 
these firm characteristics. The biggest declines during the April event were concen-
trated within firms who produce electricity with relatively low C O 2 emissions, such 
as the hydro- or nuclear-intensive firms Fortum, British Energy, and Electricite de 
France. Some coal-intensive firms such as Drax and RWE registered declines, but 
they were more modest than those of the “clean” producers. Lastly, network opera-
tors such as National Grid and Red Electrica, with no position in the production or 
sale of electricity, registered almost no impact.
To test these relationships, we limit the sample to the electricity sector and regress 
daily returns on firm fixed effects, firm-specific market returns, the average event effect 
(EVEN T t ), and several measures of firm-level intensity (interacted with EVEN T t ):
(4)   S ijt =  α i +  β i  m t + γ EVEN T t + η INTENSIT y i × EVEN T t +  ϵ ijt , 
Table 3—Stock Market Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Firms in the Electricity Sector
Main 
event
January 
counter event
Carbon 
per MWh
Carbon 
per equity
Allowances 
per equity
Net allowances 
per equity
Stock name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fortum −0.088   (0.075) 0.086   (0.060) 0.214 142.8 157.1 14.3
Verbundgesellschaft −0.086   (0.061) 0.099   (0.063) 0.252 610.5 535.5 −75.0
British Energy Group −0.071*   (0.043) 0.076**  (0.032) 0.108 1236.2 779.2 −457.0
EDF −0.050*   (0.028) 0.093**  (0.044) 0.104 459.1 402.6 −56.4
RWE (XET) −0.045**  (0.023) 0.054   (0.052) 0.909 3587.1 3436.8 −150.3
Vestas Wind −0.026   (0.033) 0.086*  (0.049)
A2A −0.024*** (0.004) 0.066**  (0.027) 0.287 812.1 1029.8 217.8
Atel Holding ‘R’ −0.022   (0.015) 0.046*  (0.025) 718.1 821.6
DRAX Group −0.019   (0.047) 0.110*** (0.012) 1.046 4384.0 3071.8 −1312.2
United Utilities Group −0.018*** (0.005) 0.030*  (0.016) 0.1 0.1
EDP Energias de Portugal −0.015   (0.011) −0.018   (0.025) 0.712 1283.8 1221.2 −62.6
Solarworld −0.013   (0.024) 0.077*** (0.026)
International Power −0.012**  (0.005) 0.091   (0.067) 0.611 1203.1 1098.4 −104.7
E.ON −0.007   (0.015) 0.003   (0.028) 0.525 1196.0 1090.8 −105.2
Red Electrica de Espana −0.005   (0.012) 0.055*  (0.03)
Scot. & Southern Energy −0.004   (0.010) 0.045*  (0.027) 0.819 1626.7 1178.7 −447.9
ENEL −0.003   (0.006) 0.037   (0.037) 0.501 1320.2 1133.3 −186.8
National Grid −0.001   (0.007) 0.022   (0.040)
Terna −0.001   (0.010) 0.021   (0.037)
Sofina −0.006   (0.013) 0.026*  (0.016)
Union Fenosa 0.004   (0.005) 0.024   (0.015) 0.972 1740.3 1382.7 −357.6
Schneider Electric 0.011   (0.020) 0.003   (0.013)
Iberdrola 0.015*** (0.002) 0.010   (0.013) 0.349 608.2 529.7 −78.6
Public Power 0.052*** (0.012) 0.014   (0.010) 0.982 11659.6 11550.4 −109.2
Coefficient estimates 0.071** 7.445*** 7.175*** −5.937
(0.033) (1.924) (2.098) (31.510)
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by date.
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where the alternative measures of INTENSIT y i are represented, by carbon/MWh (column 3), carbon/equity (column 4), allowances/equity (column 5), and net per-
mit position (column 6). The results of this regression are reported in the bottom 
row of Table 3. As with the previous results, we cluster the standard errors by date.16
The carbon intensity of the firm, both in terms of C O 2 per MWh and C O 2 per 
market cap, have significantly positive effects on abnormal returns during the April 
price-reduction event, indicating again that dirtier electricity firms fared better than 
cleaner ones during this event. These results are consistent with an explanation of 
the effects that emphasizes the importance of revenue impacts in the product mar-
kets. All the firms in Table 3 who sell bulk electricity experienced declines in rev-
enues, and only some experienced significant declines in production costs.
Many of these firms were also substantial holders of emissions permits at the 
time of the crash in permit prices. However, the results with respect to net allow-
ances are much less clear. The results for allowances are virtually identical for those 
for emissions, while there is no apparent relationship between net permit position 
and market performance. Recall from Figure 4 that emissions and allocations are 
highly colinear, and that the true net position was not known by the market during 
these events. One explanation, therefore, is that the relationship between abnormal 
returns and allowances is essentially a proxy for the relationship between returns 
and emissions.
B. Sector Level Impacts
We now examine the drivers of the event impact on returns outside of the electric-
ity sector. To do this, we first use characteristics that describe sectors as a whole. 
Coefficients on these sector-average characteristics are consistent with revenue 
effects, as described in our model, dominating the impact on firm profits. We also 
include and interact in the regression analysis limited firm-level information of EU 
Exposure and permit holdings. We find an effect for EU Exposure which we inter-
pret as affecting the magnitude of the revenue effect. We find limited impact of the 
amount of permits relative to the other factors.
Recall from Section II that the revenue effect depends on how a cost shock in an 
industry affects the output prices. In order to test the importance of these factors, 
we again estimate the effects of the price-reduction event, but now decompose the 
cumulative abnormal returns during the event window by estimating the following 
equation:
(5)  S ijt =  α i +  β i  m t +  δ 1 EVEN T t +  δ 2 Dirt y j EVEN T t +  δ 3 E E i EVEN T t 
 +  δ 4 Dirt y j E E i EVEN T t +  δ 5 NoE E i EVEN T t 
 +  δ 6 Dirt y j NoE E i EVEN T t +  ν ij , 
16 Figure A1 in the online Appendix plots the relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns and each of 
these variables of interest. We fit linear functions through the data to show the trend. The plots are consistent with 
the Table 3 results.
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where  β i measures a stock’s relationship to the broader index, Dirt y j is a measure of 
the “dirtiness” of an industry, and E E i is a firm’s revenue exposure to the EU market. 
Because we have European exposure for only a subset of our sample, the dummy 
variable NoE E i is included to indicate that E E i is missing. Here we cluster the stan-
dard errors by two-digit NACE code as this is the level of variation of our primary 
variables of interest.
We examine two different measures for Dirt y j : dirty output (D O j ) measures the 
carbon intensity, while dirty input (D I j ) measures the electricity and natural gas 
intensity. In order for  δ 1 to capture the average effect, we demean D O j , D I j , and E E i . 
We describe each of these variables in more detail below.
Dirty output is the average carbon intensity of a sector, measured at the two-
digit NACE level. The data sources include the CITL emissions data and Thomson 
Reuters Datastream financial data. For all sectors j, where at least one firm was 
matched in the CITL, D O j is given by the following formula:
(6)  D O j =  
 ∑ 
i∈(  j∩CITL)
 
 
 Emi t i 
  __ ∑ 
i∈( j∩CITL)
 
 
  S i 
  ,
where Emi t i is the facility-level emissions in 2005 from the CITL and  S i is the 2005 
revenue of firm i in thousands of US dollars. We sum over the 124 firms that we 
identified in the CITL. The subscript j indexes two-digit NACE sectors, and CITL 
indexes firms contained in the CITL emissions dataset. Emissions intensity for any 
firm in a given two-digit NACE sector will therefore be based upon the measured 
emissions of firms matched with CITL data in that sector. There were 345 firms 
contained in the STOXX 600 index drawn from these sectors.
Dirty input is the average energy intensity of a sector, also measured at the two-
digit NACE level. We use input-output tables of industrial activity where we aggre-
gate sectoral expenditures and output in 2004 for the EU-27 countries.17 The value 
D I j is the ratio of expenditures (in 2004 euros) on the utility energy sector (NACE 
code 40: Electricity, gas, steam, and hot water) over total output (in 2004 euros).
Recall from Section II, the revenue effect depends not only on how dirty an indus-
try is, but whether a firm sells into markets where the bulk of producers are likely 
to be subject to the regulation. We use the concentration of a firm’s revenues in the 
EU as a proxy for the exposure of a firm’s product markets to the regulation. The 
variable EU Exposure (E E i ) is the percentage of total sales earned in Europe and 
proxies for the company’s revenue exposure to prices in the EU market.18 Note that 
our theoretical model also pointed out the importance of demand elasticity. To the 
extent that it captures the exposure of a firm’s competitors to the regulation, E E i can 
17 Data are reported by the European Commission through the Eurostat system: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
18 These data come from come from Eurostockcity, who was the data provider to Yahoo Finance UK.
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be thought of as a measure of the sensitivity to carbon prices of a firm’s residual 
demand, or the term P′   ∂ q ≠i ∗  _∂ τ  in equation (3).19
In the sample of 600 firms, roughly 60 percent are in sectors covered by the ETS 
and therefore have nonzero values for D O j . Given that unregulated firms experience 
effectively no direct carbon-cost exposure, we treated these as equivalent to zero 
emissions firms. In the case of EE, the data were not available for the full sample of 
firms. Instead, we have measures of EU exposure for 260 firms from 39 two-digit 
NACE codes. Since we have no information on the EU exposure of the firms with 
missing data, we include a dummy variable for NoE E i .
Table 4 provides the summary statistics for 45 two-digit NACE sectors. For 
each sector, the table reports average abnormal returns during the event window. 
In  addition, we report the sectoral characteristics D O j and D I j , and the sectoral means 
for E E i , NoE E i , and market capitalization. The mining, metals, and paper sectors are 
the most utility energy intensive after the power sector: with mining experiencing 
some of the largest abnormal declines during the event window. Utilities have the 
highest carbon emissions intensity: its average stocks had an abnormal decline of 
about 1.7 percent. The total number of firms in our estimating sample is reduced 
from 600 to 552 due to incomplete stock data for 48 firms.
Results.—Table 5 reports the results of different variations of (5). The overall 
event produced a 0.5 percent decline for the full sample. The second and third col-
umns report the results controlling only for dirty output or dirty input, respectively. 
The fourth column controls only for EU Exposure and an indicator of missing expo-
sure data. Column 5 includes both dirty measures. The sixth and seventh columns 
interact either DO or DI with EU exposure, under the intuition that a revenue effect 
would be strongest in relatively “dirty” industries that are also heavily concentrated 
in the European market. The last column includes all variables.
From Table 5, there is a weak relationship between carbon intensity and perfor-
mance during the event window. Firms from industries with high emissions (large DO) 
or relatively dirty inputs (e.g., high electricity and gas usage) saw their share prices 
decline. This is suggestive of a larger revenue effect in dirtier industries. Firms in dirty 
sectors will have experienced a decline in their competitor’s, as well as their own, mar-
ginal costs. In column 5, both DO and DI measures are included. By controlling for DI, 
the effect from DO becomes stronger, now significant at the 10 percent level.
It might at first seem counterintuitive that the firms most directly impacted by 
C O 2 regulations would be the greatest losers from a decline in C O 2 prices. Recall 
that these values are measuring the relative carbon intensities of industries, not the 
individual firms within industries. Thus, we interpret these results as being consis-
tent with the hypothesis that product prices, and therefore revenues, were negatively 
impacted by the C O 2 price shock. Although costs were also reduced, either through 
the direct or indirect exposure to C O 2 regulation, it appears that the revenue effects 
were stronger. For regulated industries, this is almost certainly a consequence of the 
19 In a previous draft of this paper, we used measures of trade exposure to proxy for elasticity but found insignifi-
cant results with these proxies. Unlike the trade data, the EU exposure variable provides us with firm-level variation 
as well as broader coverage of nongoods sectors.
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fact that allocations were closely linked to emissions, as illustrated above. For these 
firms, the revenue effects would naturally be the strongest as the reductions in costs 
are largely offset by a concurrent reduction in the value of permit holdings.
This conclusion becomes more clear when we examine the interaction of DO and 
DI with a firm’s exposure to the EU market. First note that, by itself, EU Exposure is 
an insignificant determinant of the event impact, and the indicator of whether a firm 
is missing EE data is also insignificant (see column 4). In column 6, DO is inter-
acted with EU exposure. The interaction term between DO and EE is highly signifi-
cant and negative while the DO coefficient is no longer significant. The  interaction 
Table 4—Summary Statistics by Industry
Industry description
Event 
return
Dirty 
output
Dirty 
input
Avg. EU 
exposure
Fraction 
missing EE
Market 
cap
Coal and lignite mining −0.032 0.006 0.083 0.165 0.000 58,800
Crude petroleum extraction −0.032 0.126 0.008 0.491 0.200 32,400
Basic metals −0.031 0.416 0.039 0.565 0.067 10,500
Sewage and refuse −0.027 0.000 0.011 1.000 0.000 2,910
Water transport −0.027 0.000 0.002 #N/A 1.000 5,880
Refining and coke −0.027 0.024 0.010 0.585 0.000 132,000
Computer manufacturing −0.023 0.000 0.005 #N/A 1.000 3,830
Metal ores mining −0.023 0.012 0.057 0.493 0.000 16,500
Tobacco manufacturing −0.019 0.000 0.009 #N/A 1.000 26,600
Electricity and gas −0.017 0.975 0.204 0.865 0.077 21,400
Real estate −0.016 0.038 0.005 0.980 0.875 4,990
Water −0.016 0.000 0.051 0.920 0.000 11,100
Land transport −0.011 0.000 0.011 0.540 0.600 3,440
Rubber and plastics −0.010 0.023 0.023 0.690 0.667 9,900
Computer activities −0.009 0.005 0.003 0.665 0.818 10,300
Other transport −0.009 0.001 0.009 0.423 0.125 12,100
Hotels and restaurants −0.009 0.000 0.012 #N/A 1.000 6,790
Motor vehicles −0.008 0.023 0.008 0.592 0.455 19,100
Radio and TV −0.008 0.001 0.008 0.504 0.583 17,700
Electrical machinery −0.007 0.001 0.012 0.506 0.167 25,200
Retail trade −0.006 0.000 0.015 0.987 0.842 13,400
Construction −0.006 0.010 0.002 0.726 0.357 6,900
Medical instruments −0.005 0.002 0.006 0.483 0.529 6,550
Publishing and printing −0.004 0.000 0.010 0.360 0.889 7,970
Air transport −0.003 0.006 0.002 0.610 0.800 6,100
Pulp and paper −0.003 0.143 0.044 0.773 0.200 7,550
Food manufacturing −0.003 0.008 0.015 0.495 0.905 20,800
Other business activities −0.001 0.105 0.004 0.742 0.536 20,200
Auxiliary financials 0.000 0.000 0.004 1.000 0.778 6,990
Machinery 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.490 0.111 7,410
Chemicals 0.000 0.020 0.023 0.544 0.342 24,200
Financial intermediation 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.836 0.833 20,600
Apparel manufacturing 0.002 0.000 0.008 #N/A 1.000 21,700
Post and telecomm 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.906 0.741 26,400
Furniture 0.003 0.000 0.010 0.460 0.333 12,100
Insurance 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.826 0.808 18,200
Recreational and cultural 0.005 0.023 0.010 #N/A 1.000 8,150
Health and social work 0.007 0.000 0.008 1.000 0.000 2,370
Tanning leather 0.007 0.000 0.009 0.420 0.000 10,500
Fabricated metals 0.008 0.010 0.015 0.663 0.000 6,060
Nonmetallic manufacturing 0.009 0.416 0.043 0.494 0.000 12,500
Wholesale trade 0.010 0.000 0.006 0.780 0.286 5,050
Supporting transport 0.014 0.088 0.006 0.816 0.300 7,080
Other mining 0.016 0.073 0.039 0.750 0.000 5,310
Renting machinery 0.022 0.000 0.004 0.590 0.000 1,450
All industries −0.005 0.087 0.020 0.655 0.529 16,600
Notes: The table reports the sample mean for each two-digit NACE sector. Dirty Output, Dirty Input, and 
EU Exposure are defined in the text. Market cap is equity value in millions of US dollars on April 25, 2006.
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between NoEE and DO is insignificant. As we have demeaned the continuous vari-
ables, this suggests that the firms not reporting EE are similar to the average firm 
that does report. Overall, these findings imply that it was firms with high EU expo-
sure who were largely driving the negative value on DO seen in column 2. Firms 
that were both highly concentrated in Europe and selling products produced by dirty 
industries experienced the sharpest declines. In column 7, the coefficients on the 
interaction between DI and EE are large in magnitude but imprecisely estimated. 
The full model is consistent with column 6 results but less precisely estimated.
In Table A4 of the online Appendix, we examine the robustness of these results 
in several ways. The first two columns repeat our main coefficients for columns 5 
and 6 of Table 5, but use two-way clustered standard errors (by firm and date). 
Column 1 suggests that with both DO and DI, DO is significant at the six percent 
level. Column 2 supports the main results. Columns 3 and 4 examine the big event 
window consisting of five days prior and 25 days after April 25, 2006 and perform 
the same analysis as (5). We find qualitatively similar results as in Table 5, though 
much less precisely estimated. For example, there was a two percent reduction in 
the average stock performance. Interestingly, the impacts of EU exposure are much 
stronger than during the shorter event window. While firms in “clean” industries with 
EU exposure do better during the event, the coefficient on the interaction of “dirty” 
and EU exposure is still negative but no longer significant. The overall market expe-
rienced much larger declines during the large window, while those concentrated in 
Europe performed disproportionately better. The last two columns repeat the analysis 
for a two-year period centered around a counterfactual three-day “event” beginning 
Table 5—Heterogeneous Event Study by Industry Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Event −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.007** −0.005*** −0.005* −0.005* −0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Dirty output −0.017*** −0.018 −0.008 −0.03
 × event (0.006) (0.031) (0.007) (0.036)
Dirty input −0.08*** 0.003 −0.054 0.101
 × event (0.019) (0.146) (0.045) (0.178)
EU exposure 0.011 0.019* 0.017 0.019*
 × event (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Missing exposure 0.003 0 0.001 0.001
 × event (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DO × exposure −0.081*** −0.18*
 × event (0.026) (0.092)
DO × missing −0.005 −0.008
 × event (0.012) (0.030)
DI × exposure −0.238 0.553
 × event (0.162) (0.477)
DI × missing 0.044 0.055
 × event (0.051) (0.155)
Notes: Firm fixed effects and firm-specific “betas” (coefficients on market returns) are not shown. The dependent 
variable is the daily percent change in a stock’s price. Standard errors are clustered by two-digit NACE codes. There 
are 552 firms and 249,844 observations.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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April 25, 2004—before the market had even begun. No coefficients are significant 
in this placebo test.
We perform further specification robustness checks not reported in this table. As in 
Table 2, we find that including a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio interacted with the event 
window. Although debt-to-equity is significant, it does not change the  underlying pic-
ture with regards to dirty inputs and outputs during the short event window. We also 
find similar results when just testing the event on the unadjusted cumulative returns 
(e.g., no β term) of the shares. We also examine the sensitivity of the results to the 
power and heat sector. Recall that this sector was one of the “dirtiest” in terms of both 
outputs and inputs. When the power and heat sector (NACE 4011) is excluded, the 
results are qualitatively similar: the interaction between EE and DO is of similar sign 
and magnitude but noisier. In particular, the coefficient is significant with robust stan-
dard errors, while they are insignificant when standard errors are clustered by two-digit 
NACE code. Finally, additional robustness tests not reported here examine possible 
spillovers to the United States, and run falsification tests for a previous spring.20
Asset Value of Permit Holdings.—Finally, we examine the effect of firm-level 
permit allocation and emissions on the performance of share prices during the event. 
Building upon the standard business rhetoric that views the costs of a regulation as 
driven by the asset value of permit holdings, we investigate and find that the per-
mit price effects are not strong relative to the revenue effect. Using the CITL data 
described in Section IIIA, we modify equation (5) to include firm-level initial allo-
cation of allowances and emissions:
(7)  S ijt =  α i +  β i  m t +  δ 1 EVEN T t +  δ 2 Dirt y j EVEN T t +  δ 3 E E i EVEN T t 
 +  δ 4 Dirt y j E E i EVEN T t +  δ 5 NoE E i EVEN T t 
 +  δ 6 Dirt y j NoE E i EVEN T t 
 + μ ×  (  A i −  E i  _ C i   ) EVEN T t + ψ missN A i +  ε ij , 
where the new variables are defined as:  A i is allowances,  E i is emissions,  C i is market 
capitalization, and missN A i is a dummy variable that indicates a firm is missing net 
allowance data. In particular, we modify the main model of column 6 of Table 5.
In our model, given a drop in permit prices, those firms with a more positive 
net permit positions ( A i >  E i ) will lose more profits than others with fewer, all 
20 In Bushnell, Chong, and Mansur (2009), we replicate the analysis using US data for the stocks in the US 
Standard and Poors 500 index. When all factors are considered, the only variable with a significant impact on 
returns is the DO index variable, which is positive, indicating that dirty firms experienced an increase relative 
to cleaner firms during this period. However, the United States may not be a clean control group due to the large 
number of multinational firms, linkages of product markets through international trade, and political impacts. We 
have also replicated the analysis using a similar time frame from the year 2004, a date before the EU C O 2 market 
came into existence, as a form of falsification test. Although certain characteristics were significant in determining 
the abnormal returns of shares during this 2004 “falsification” period, the results are quite different from the results 
from the 2006 C O 2 price crash.
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else equal. The net permit position ( A i −  E i ) is normalized by market capitaliza-
tion. This is done because larger firms could have greater variation of net permits. 
Furthermore, this normalization implies a μ coefficient of the change in market capi-
talization given a change in net permits.
One hypothesis likens the cost of a regulation to the change in the price of permits. 
If profit impacts were driven completely by net emissions costs, we hypothesize that 
the coefficient μ would equal roughly the drop in permit price times three, or −42. 
A firm with, for example, one million tonnes of excess permits in 2005 may be 
expected to have extra permits in 2006 and 2007. The value of these unused permits 
fell by the drop in the permit price, which was around €14. Hence, this hypothetical 
firm would have lost €42 million: 1 million tonnes/year × 3 years × −€14/tonne.
Table 6 reports our estimates. Column 1 estimates equation (7). The coefficient on 
net positions is not statistically different from zero and is statistically different from 
−42 at the 5 percent significance level. Columns 2 through 8 report different analyses 
of the impact of permit allocations. In columns 2 through 4, we separate  emissions 
Table 6—Firm-Level Permit Allowances and Emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Event −0.007*** −0.006*** −0.006*** −0.006** −0.007** −0.012*** −0.013*** −0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dirty output −0.007 −0.009 −0.01 −0.010 −0.006 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002
 × event (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
EU exposure 0.019* 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.019*
 × event (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Missing exposure −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
 × event (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
DO × exposure −0.083*** −0.088*** −0.09*** −0.093*** −0.082*** −0.103*** −0.105*** −0.104***
 × event (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
DO × missing −0.006 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.006 −0.010 −0.010 −0.010
 × event (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Net × event −15.605
(9.445)
Allow × event 4.752** −8.978
(2.355) (15.584)
Emit × event 4.900** 13.594
(1.870) (13.325)
Net × electric −12.465
 × event (11.414)
Allow × electric 8.033*** 5.476
 × event (0.680) (6.094)
Emit × electric 7.896*** 2.652
 × event (0.773) (6.681)
Net × other −21.593
 × event (25.008)
Allow × other −21.323*** 5.755
 × event (6.484) (15.822)
Emit × other −24.577***−30.735*
 × event (7.238) (15.654)
Missing net emit 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.009** 0.010** 0.010**
 × event (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Note: See Table 5.
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and allocations while still normalizing by market capitalization. Firms with more 
emissions liabilities statistically significantly benefited when the stock price fell 
(column 3), but the coefficient on allowances is also positive (column 2). The two 
coefficients are similar because allocations and emissions are highly colinear, as 
described in Figure 4. When both variables are included (column 4), both coefficients 
are not statistically different from zero, as would be expected from the colinearity.
Columns 5 through 8 of Table 6 look at the heterogeneity of the asset holding 
variables between industries that were short permits (the electricity sector) versus 
industries that were long. The preceding analysis is repeated with an interaction 
of the asset holding variables with whether the firm was in the electricity sector or 
not. The net allowance position (column 5) is similarly negative with large standard 
errors. When including allowances or emissions separately (column 6 and 7), the 
sign of the coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero but of oppo-
site sign between electricity and other firms. For the electricity sector, the cleaner 
firms suffered more from the price drop. For the other sectors, the dirtier firms suf-
fered more. Again, coefficient estimates between column 6 and 7 are similar due to 
the colinearity, so the mechanism cannot be separated. When both allowances and 
emissions are included together (column 8), the results are mostly not statistically 
significant and the signs differ between columns 4 and 8.
The results on permit allocation are noisy and should not be interpreted too strongly 
because of data issues. Net permit position information is only available for 124 of 
the firms. Incomplete matching of emission data to firms could mean that a firm that 
has matched one installation may have many more emissions. There is also limited 
variation on net allocation, as the emissions and allowances are close. Online Appendix 
Table A1 shows the variation in emissions, allocation, and net position by industry.
Table 6 does show that the estimates of the main result, the revenue effect, is 
not highly affected by including permit allowances. In particular, the Dirty Output 
× Exposure coefficients are stable across the specifications. While we do not have 
sufficient variation to rule out that permit holdings had some effect, our results imply 
that investors focus on product price impacts, rather than just compliance costs and 
the nominal value of pollution permits.
IV. Conclusions
The development and application of any significant new environmental regula-
tion will involve some level of debate over its economic impacts. This is particularly 
true in the case of regulations to combat climate change because the stakes are so 
high. The annual value of permits consumed in the European ETS market we study 
reached nearly $60 billion. A market in the United States would be two to three times 
the size of the European market. These values are an order of magnitude larger than 
any other previous emissions trading markets. These sums have generated intense 
interest in the potential incidence of these costs, and many industries are making the 
case for some form of free permit allocation to offset these costs.
However, the cost impact is only one part of the story from the perspective of firms 
and industries. The impact of emissions costs on revenues is another critical con-
sideration. The policy implications of this full spectrum of impacts has drawn us to 
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examine the European ETS market. Our event-study approach analyzes the response 
of the stock market to the devaluation of C O 2 permit prices in late April 2006. 
This provides one of the first opportunities to empirically test the impacts of C O 2 
regulation on major industries and firms. By looking at the impact of a sharp decline 
in C O 2 prices on the equity prices of impacted firms, we can get a strong sense of 
what the market believes to be the net impacts of C O 2 regulations.
The story that emerges from an examination of this event is that the equity markets 
were strongly focused on revenue effects. Our results demonstrate, fairly robustly, 
that the share prices of firms from the “dirtiest” industries experienced the largest 
abnormal declines during this period.
Within the power sector, which was as a whole “short” of permits, the share 
prices of firms with the highest emissions rates, perform better than the “cleaner” 
firms within this sector. The share prices of many of these high emissions firms did 
experience abnormal declines, but these declines were less severe than those of their 
low carbon intensity competitors. The fact that very low-carbon emissions electric-
ity firms declined the most gives strong indication that the market understood how 
declining C O 2 prices would reduce the revenues of these firms through lower elec-
tricity prices. High emissions firms still experienced declines despite a lessening of 
regulation. This highlights the fact that the market revenue effects outweighed their 
cost savings from lower C O 2 prices, including any allowance effects. Within other 
industries that were in aggregate allocated more allowances than were consumed, 
those firms with the largest allowances experienced the largest abnormal declines.
It is important to recognize the many caveats that must be applied to interpreting 
these results. The ETS was a very new market, which was one of the causes of the 
variation in the emissions permit price that we utilize here. It would be heroic to 
assume that the stock market completely and accurately processed the information 
that emerged in late April 2006. In addition, while the crash affected both near-term 
and long-term C O 2 prices, the impact on the near-term Phase I prices was much more 
pronounced. The events of 2006 may also have impacted expectations about future 
allocations of emissions permits, as well as expectations about prices. Because our 
event study uses the same time window for all stocks, any contemporaneous events 
could also be causing the abnormal returns. We looked for sector-specific announce-
ments in this period. Specifically, oil prices did not change dramatically.
Nonetheless, these results are largely consistent with what simulation studies had 
predicted could be the case for many of these industries. These studies forecast an 
increase in revenues that would largely offset the increase in regulatory costs. In 
fact, our results imply that for clean firms in dirty industries like electricity, these 
revenue effects are larger than cost increases. These are important facts to bear in 
mind when setting policies regarding allocations to impacted industries. In many 
cases, those directly or even indirectly impacted by C O 2 costs may need little com-
pensation. Instead, it is their customers who will be most affected.
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Appendix 
A Model of Impacts of Allowance Prices on Profits
This Appendix presents a static theory model representing the channels through 
which profits can be impacted by an exogenous change in environmental costs (e.g., 
permit prices). 
Recall equation (2) in the text: firm i profits are
(2)   π i = P ( q i +  q ≠i )  q i −  C i ( q i , ω) + τ  A i − τ  r i (  q i ,  I i )  q i − k ( I i ).
The impact on profits of a marginal change in τ can be expressed as
(A1)   d π i  _
d τ  = P  
d q i  _
dτ  + P′ ∙  [ d q i  _d τ  +  d q ≠i  _d τ  ]  q i −  ∂ C i  _∂ q i    ∂ q i  _∂ τ  −  ∂ C i  _∂ ω   ∂ ω _∂ τ  
 +  A i −  r i  q i − τ  ( ∂ r i  _∂ q i   q i +  r i )  d q i  _d τ  −  ( τ  ∂  r i  _∂ I i   q i + k′ ( I i ) )  d I i  _d τ  .
This effect applies to incremental changes in τ. Large changes in τ would 
require integrating over this function, however for changes in τ that result in mar-
ginal changes in  q i and  I i we can apply the envelope theorem to further simplify 
this expression. Assuming that firms maximize profits with respect to q, we can 
write the optimal output  q i ∗ as a function, f  ( ⋅ ), of the competitors’ production, the 
direct effect of the permit price, and the indirect effect through input prices:  q i ∗ = f  ( q ≠i , τ, ω(τ)). Next, define  π i ∗ ≡  π i ( q i ∗ ). For shocks that have marginal influence 
on  q i , the envelope theorem implies
(A2)   ∂  π i 
∗  _∂ q i   = P + P′  q i 
∗ −  ∂ C i  _∂ q i   − τ  ( r i ′  q i 
∗ +  r i ) = 0.
In other words, the change in profitability through own output would be negligible. 
Similarly, the last term of (A1) articulates the change in emissions and capital costs 
resulting from a change in abatement investment,  I i . At an optimal level of abate-
ment, where  ∂  π i  _∂ I i ∗  = 0, a firm would set its marginal cost of abatement equal to the 
marginal cost of emissions.
(A3)  τ  ∂ r i  _∂ I i ∗   q i − k′ ( I i 
∗ ) = 0.
Again assuming that investment I is relatively inelastic to local changes in τ, the 
last term in (A1) becomes zero. However, there are still effects relating to changes 
in market prices due to the responses of other firms in the industry, direct costs, and 
the value of net allowance holdings. This can be seen by combining equations (2), 
(A2), and (A3):
(A4)   d π i 
∗  _
d τ  = P′  
d q ≠i 
 _
d τ   q i ∗ −  
∂ C i  _∂ ω   
d ω _
d τ  +  A i −  r i  q i ∗ .
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Finally, by recognizing that each firm’s optimal output response can be written 
as a f  ( ⋅ ) function, we define the effect of a change in τ on other firms’ output as the 
sum of a direct component and an indirect effect through input prices:
(A5)   d q ≠i 
∗  _
d τ  =  
∂ q ≠i ∗  _∂ τ  +  
∂ q ≠i ∗  _∂ ω   
∂ ω _∂ τ  .
From this, we derive equation (3) that we restate here:
(3)   d π i 
∗  _
dτ  = P′  
∂  q ≠i ∗  _∂ τ   q i 
∗ +  [ P′  ∂  q ≠i ∗  _∂ ω   q i ∗ −  ∂ C _∂ ω  ]   ∂ ω _∂ τ  +  [ A i −  r i  q i ∗ ] . 
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